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A B S T R A C T
To analyze anti-poverty policies in tandem with the taxes used to pay for them, comparisons of poverty
before and after taxes and transfers are often used. We show that these comparisons, as well as measures
of horizontal equity and progressivity, can fail to capture an important aspect: that a substantial proportion
of the poor are made poorer (or non-poor made poor) by the tax and transfer system. We illustrate with
data from seventeen developing countries: in ﬁfteen, the ﬁscal system is poverty-reducing and progressive,
but in ten of these at least one-quarter of the poor pay more in taxes than they receive in transfers. We call
this ﬁscal impoverishment, and axiomatically derive a measure of its extent. An analogous measure of ﬁscal
gains of the poor is also derived, and we show that changes in the poverty gap can be decomposed into our
axiomatic measures of ﬁscal impoverishment and gains.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Anti-poverty policies are often evaluated in isolation from the
taxes used to pay for them.1 If, however, taxes cancel out the
beneﬁts of transfers for many poor households, so that some poor
pay more in taxes than they receive in transfers, the objective
of these policies might be compromised. This is especially impor-
tant when poverty traps exist at the individual level (e.g., Ghatak,
2015, Ravallion, 2015): a tax and transfer system in which many
poor pay more in taxes than they receive in transfers risks push-
ing the transiently poor into chronic poverty by shifting their after
tax and transfer incomes below their individual-speciﬁc poverty trap
thresholds.
Recently, the connection between anti-poverty policies and the
taxes used to pay for them has come into the spotlight in the debates
over the United Nations’ Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.
In recognition of the resources necessary to achieve these ambi-
tious development goals, and partly as a consequence of austerity
* Corresponding Author.
E-mail addresses: shiggins@tulane.edu (S. Higgins), nlustig@tulane.edu (N. Lustig).
1 We focus on anti-poverty policies that are redistributive in nature, one of the three
categories of anti-poverty policies described in Ghatak (2015).
in advanced countries (and thus lower anticipated ﬂows of inter-
national aid to developing countries), much of the discussion has
focused on how developing countries should collect the revenue
necessary to achieve the goals.2 Inﬂuential organizations such as
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank emphasize the
importance of eﬃcient taxes with minimal exemptions (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2013, World Bank, 2013). When concerns
are raised about these taxes—such as a no-exemption value added
tax—falling disproportionately on the poor, many argue that higher
tax burdens on the poor are acceptable if they are accompanied by
suﬃciently large targeted transfers: “spending instruments are avail-
able that are better targeted to the pursuit of equity concerns”
(Keen and Lockwood, 2010, p.141). Similarly, Engel et al. (1999, p.
186) assert that “it is quite obvious that the disadvantages of a
proportional tax are moderated by adequate targeting” of transfers,
since “what the poor individual pays in taxes is returned to her.”
These taxes “might conceivably be the best way to ﬁnance pro-poor
expenditures, with the net effect being to relieve poverty” (Ebrill
et al., 2001, p. 105).
How can we be sure that what the poor individual pays in taxes
is returned to her? Even if the net effect of taxes and transfers is
2 See, for example, the focus on domestic resource mobilization in United Nations
(2015).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.001
0304-3878/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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to relieve poverty, are some poor made worse off? When taxes and
transfers are analyzed in tandem to determine how they affect the
poor, it is common to compare poverty before taxes and transfers
(“pre-ﬁsc”) to poverty after taxes and transfers (“post-ﬁsc”). As we
show in this paper, however, a ﬁscal system can be unambiguously
poverty-reducing for a range of poverty lines and any poverty mea-
sure, yet still make a substantial proportion of the poor worse off.
This phenomenon does not only occur with regressive taxes: we
show that taxes and transfers can be globally progressive, unam-
biguously equalizing, and unambiguously poverty-reducing and still
make many poor worse off. In other words, conventional tools
used to measure how the poor are affected by the tax and transfer
system are inadequate to measure whether some of the poor pay
more in taxes than they receive in transfers, a phenomenon we call
ﬁscal impoverishment (FI).
We also show that in practice, there are a number of coun-
tries with poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer systems
that nevertheless make a substantial proportion of the poor poorer
(or non-poor poor), illustrating with data from seventeen developing
countries.3 In ﬁfteen of these countries, post-ﬁsc poverty is unam-
biguously lower than pre-ﬁsc poverty (measured with any poverty
line up to $1.25 per person per day in low and lower-middle income
countries and $2.50 per day in upper-middle income countries)4
and the tax and transfer system is globally progressive and
unambiguously equalizing, i.e., we would conclude that the tax and
transfer system unambiguously beneﬁts the poor using conventional
measures, potentially overlooking impoverishment. In all of these
countries, some degree of FI occurs, and in ten of them we ﬁnd that
at least one-quarter of the poor pay more in taxes than they receive
in transfers.
In light of the debate about ﬁnancing anti-poverty policies
and the Sustainable Development Goals, it is necessary to ﬁll this
gap in the measurement arsenal and develop a measure of this
phenomenon that adheres to certain properties. We axiomatically
derive a measure of FI, as well as an analogous measure for ﬁscal
gains of the poor (FGP), which captures the extent to which some
poor receivemore in transfers than they pay in taxes.5 We then show
how a commonly used measure of poverty that overlooks the extent
of FI, the poverty gap, can be decomposed into FI and FGP com-
ponents using our axiomatic measures, again illustrating with data
from seventeen developing countries. Because the extent of FI and
FGP depends on the particular poverty line used, we also propose
dominance criteria that can be used to determine whether one ﬁscal
system (such as the one that would occur after a proposed reform)
causes unambiguously less FI or more FGP than another (such as
3 Our illustration uses results provided to us by the authors of country studies con-
ducted as part of the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute, located at Tulane Univer-
sity (www.commitmenttoequity.org). The countries included are Armenia (Younger
and Khachatryan, 2016), Bolivia (Paz Arauco et al., 2014), Brazil (authors’ calculations),
Chile (Martínez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2015), the Dominican Republic (Aristy-
Escuder et al., 2016), Ecuador (Llerena Pinto et al., 2015), El Salvador (Beneke
et al., 2015), Ethiopia (Hill et al., 2016), Ghana (Younger et al., 2015), Guatemala
(Cabrera et al., 2015), Indonesia (Afkar et al., 2016), Mexico (Aranda and Scott, 2015),
Peru (Jaramillo et al., 2015), Russia (Lopez-Calva et al., 2016), South Africa (Inchauste
et al., 2016), Sri Lanka (Arunatilake et al., 2106), and Tunisia (Shimeles et al., 2016).
For an overview of the impact of taxes and social spending on inequality and poverty
in many of these countries, see Lustig (2015).
4 The $1.25 per person per day poverty line (in 2005 US dollars adjusted for pur-
chasing power parity) is approximately equal to the median poverty line of the ﬁfteen
poorest countries for which poverty line data are available, and the $2.50 line to the
median of the world’s low and middle income countries excluding the ﬁfteen poorest
(Chen and Ravallion, 2010).
5 Our axioms are adapted from the axiomatic poverty and mobility measurement
literatures (see Foster, 2006 and Zheng, 1997 for surveys of axiomatic poverty mea-
surement and Fields, 2001 for a survey of axiomatic mobility measurement). Our
resulting measure can be viewed as a censored directional version of the mobility
measure derived by Fields and Ok (1996).
the current system) over a range of poverty lines. We analyze FI
and FGP over a range of poverty lines in Brazil, which is a perti-
nent example due to the coexistence of high tax burdens on the poor
(Baer and Galvão, 2008, Goñi et al., 2011) and lauded poverty-
reducing cash transfer programs: a large-scale conditional cash
transfer program that reaches over one-fourth of all Brazilian
households and a non-contributory pension program for the elderly
poor that reaches one-third of all elderly (Levy and Schady, 2013,
Table 1).
Section 2 uses hypothetical and empirical examples to show that
common tools to assess how the tax and transfer system affects the
poor can fail to capture FI. Section 3 axiomatically derives a measure
that does capture FI; it then proposes a partial FI ordering that can
be used to compare the level of FI induced by two ﬁscal systems for
any poverty line. Section 4 derives an analogous measure and partial
ordering for FGP and shows that the poverty gap can be decomposed
into our axiomatic measures of FI and FGP. Section 5 uses data from
seventeen developing countries to illustrate the axiomatic measures
and poverty gap decomposition. Section 6 concludes, and the formal
axioms and proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. The problems with conventional measures
Through a number of examples, we illustrate and explain the
problems with conventional measures of poverty, horizontal equity,
and progressivity. Of course, these measures are still quite impor-
tant for assessing a tax and transfer system; we merely aim to show
that they do not capture everything we are interested in. First, in
Section 2.1 we show the problem with poverty measures when they
are used to compare poverty before and after taxes and transfers.
Although comparisons of pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc poverty are com-
mon in empirical studies (e.g., DeFina and Thanawala, 2004, Hoynes
et al., 2006), poverty measures can overlook ﬁscal impoverishment
because they obey the anonymity axiom (which is usually taken as
an innocuous and desirable axiom): the tax and transfer system can
reduce poverty while simultaneously making a substantial portion
of the poor poorer, or making some non-poor poor. The anonymity
axiom is not the only culprit for the shortcomings of existing
measures, however: in Section 2.2 we show that measures designed
to incorporate information about individuals’ pre-ﬁsc positions,
such as measures of horizontal equity and progressivity, can also
fail to capture FI.6 To show that these shortcomings of conventional
measures are not conﬁned to contrived hypothetical examples,
but rather occur frequently in practice, in Section 2.3 we present
examples from seventeen developing countries: in ten, the tax
and transfer system is poverty-reducing and progressive, but
hurts a substantial portion of the poor by pushing them deeper into
poverty.
2.1. Poverty measures
Suppose the change in poverty caused by the ﬁscal system will
be evaluated over a range of poverty lines, including lines greater
than 6 and less than or equal to 10. Suppose there are three individ-
uals in society with pre-ﬁsc incomes of 5, 8, and 20, and (retaining
the order of the individuals) post-ﬁsc incomes 9, 6, and 18. For any
poverty line in the range we are considering, and for any poverty
measure in a broad class of measures, poverty has either not changed
or decreased. This is because the poorest individual in the pre-ﬁsc
6 Other measures that are sometimes used, such as the percent of income gained
or lost by each pre-ﬁsc income decile, overlook FI for a distinct reason: they average
over individuals, so for example the poorest decile could gain income on averagewhile
a substantial number of poor within the ﬁrst decile lose income. We do not include
these measures in this paper since the reason they overlook FI is obvious.
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income distribution has an income of 5 and the second-poorest 8,
while in the post-ﬁsc distribution, the poorest has an income of
6 and the second-poorest 9. Poverty comparisons do not take into
account that the poorest individual in the post-ﬁsc distribution,
with an income of 6, is not the poorest individual in the pre-ﬁsc
distribution who has an income of 5, but instead had an income of 8
in the pre-ﬁsc distirbution and paid 2more in taxes than she received
in transfers. Depending on the exact poverty line chosen within the
rangewe are considering, this individual was either pre-ﬁsc poor and
lost income to the ﬁscal system, or pre-ﬁsc non-poor and pushed into
poverty by the ﬁscal system.
It is clear, then, that poverty measures are inadequate to measure
whether some of the poor pay more in taxes than they receive in
transfers. Stochastic dominance tests, which are used to determine
whether poverty is unambiguously lower in one income distribu-
tion than another for any poverty line and a broad class of poverty
measures (Atkinson, 1987, Foster and Shorrocks, 1988), are also
inadequate. This is because poverty measures and stochastic dom-
inance tests are anonymous with respect to pre-ﬁsc income: they
compare the pre- and post-ﬁsc income distributions without paying
attention to the speciﬁc pre-ﬁsc to post-ﬁsc trajectory of particu-
lar individuals’ incomes. The anonymity axiom, normally considered
an innocuous and desirable property, becomes problematic when
we are concerned with how the ﬁscal system affects the poor: in
the words of Amiel and Cowell (1994, p. 448–9), “anonymity itself
may be questionable as a welfare criterion when the social-welfare
function is to take into account something more than the end-state
distribution of incomes.” Anonymity implies that poverty mea-
sures fail to take into account individuals’ initial positions, and
thus whether some are being made poorer by the tax and transfer
system.7
To illustrate visually, Fig. 1 shows a stylistic representation
of the pre- and post-ﬁsc incomes of a population ordered by
pre-ﬁsc income. The increasing curve represents pre-ﬁsc income,
the wavy curve post-ﬁsc income, and the dashed line the
poverty line; because some individuals receive more in transfers
than they pay in taxes, while others pay more in taxes than
they receive in transfers, the post-ﬁsc income curve is some-
times above and sometimes below the pre-ﬁsc income curve.
Although post-ﬁsc poverty is lower than pre-ﬁsc poverty because
the losses of some poor are more than compensated by the
gains of other poor, there is FI. The extent of FI is shown by
the dark-shaded areas, while the light-shaded areas represent the
extent of FGP (using the measures we axiomatically derive in
Sections 3 and 4).
2.2. Horizontal equity and progressivity
Anonymity is not the only reason conventional measures
overlook ﬁscal impoverishment: non-anonymous measures such
as horizontal equity and progressivity, which are designed to
incorporate information about an individual’s pre-ﬁsc position, can
7 Amiel and Cowell (1994) also point out that the respect for income dominance
axiom is only equivalent to the monotonicity axiom when anonymity is imposed.
In the example from the previous paragraph, the post-ﬁsc income distribution ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates the pre-ﬁsc distribution on the domain from 0 to
the maximum poverty line, so it would be evaluated as superior by any measure
satisfying poverty focus and respect for income dominance (or, equivalently, poverty
focus and both monotonicity and anonymity). It would not necessarily be evaluated
as superior by a measure satisfying poverty focus and monotonicity but not
anonymity, however. Other concerns with the anonymity axiom have also been
pointed out: for example, it can clash with the Pigou–Dalton transfer axiom when
there are households of different types (Ebert, 1997) andwith the subgroup sensitivity
axiom, an extension of the Pigou–Dalton transfer axiom to subgroups (Subramanian,
2006).
Population ordered by pre−fisc income
Pre−fisc
Post−fisc
Poverty line
Fiscal impoverishment
Fiscal gains of the poor
Income
Fig. 1. Stylistic illustration of ﬁscal impoverishment and gains to the poor.
fail to capture FI because they are not concerned with whether her
net tax burden (taxes paid minus transfers received) is positive or
negative. Denote income before taxes and transfers by y0i ∈ R+ and
income after taxes and transfers by y1i ∈ R+ for each i ∈ S, where
S is the set of individuals in society. Consider a range of poten-
tial poverty lines Z ⊂ R+. Each individual’s income before or
after taxes and transfers is arranged in the vector y0 or y1, both
ordered in ascending order of pre-ﬁsc income y0i —even if rerank-
ing occurs, the order of the y1 vector reﬂects the pre-ﬁsc income
ranking.
Horizontal equity can be deﬁned in two ways: the rerank-
ing deﬁnition, which requires that no pair of individuals switch
ranks, and the classical deﬁnition, which requires that pre-ﬁsc
equals are treated equally by the tax and transfer system. Under
either deﬁnition, the existence or absence of horizontal equity
among the poor does not tell us whether FI has occurred. Even
if some are impoverished by the tax and transfer system, the
ranking among the poor may not change (so there is horizon-
tal equity by the reranking deﬁnition) and pre-ﬁsc equals may
be impoverished to the same degree (so there is classical hor-
izontal equity): e.g., Z = (6, 10], y0 = (1, 1, 7, 7, 13), y1 =
(3, 3, 6, 6, 11). Nor does horizontal inequity among the poor neces-
sarily imply FI, because there could be reranking among the poor or
unequal treatment among pre-ﬁsc equals when the tax and trans-
fer system lifts incomes of some of the poor without decreasing
incomes of any poor: e.g., Z = (6, 10], y0 = (5, 5, 6, 20), y1 =
(5, 7, 6, 18).
A tax and transfer system is everywhere progressive when net
taxes (i.e., taxes minus beneﬁts), relative to pre-ﬁsc income, increase
with income (Duclos, 1997, Lambert, 1988). The tax and transfer
system can be progressive (and unambiguously equalizing) but
cause ﬁscal impoverishment: e.g., Z = (6, 10], y0 = (1, 3, 7, 13),
y1 = (3, 4, 6, 11); net taxes relative to pre-ﬁsc income increase with
income, but the third individual whose income falls from 7 to 6
is ﬁscally impoverished. Thus, progressivity is not a suﬃcient condi-
tion to ensure that FI does not occur. Nor is progressivity a necessary
condition for the absence of FI: e.g., Z = (6, 10], y0= (1, 3, 7, 14),
y1= (1, 5, 8, 11), which involves no FI but is not everywhere pro-
gressive because net taxes ﬁrst decrease with income when moving
from the poorest to the second-poorest, then increase with income
thereafter.
Table 1 summarizes the examples presented in Sections 2.1
and 2.2 to show that conventional tools—speciﬁcally, poverty mea-
sures (and stochastic dominance tests) and measures of or tests for
horizontal equity and progressivity—can overlook FI.
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Table 1
Summary of the problems with conventional measures.
Measure Issue Example with Z = (6, 10]
Poverty (and stochastic dominance) ↓ poverty no FI (anonymity) y0 = (5, 8, 20), y1 = (9, 6, 18)
Horizontal equity Horizontally equitable no FI y0 = (1, 1, 7, 7, 13), y1 = (3, 3, 6, 6, 11)
No FI horizontally equitable y0 = (5, 5, 6, 20), y1 = (5, 7, 6, 18)
Progressivity Progressive no FI y0 = (1, 3, 7, 13), y1 = (3, 4, 6, 11)
No FI progressive y0 = (1, 3, 7, 14), y1 = (1, 5, 8, 11)
2.3. Real-world examples
The problems with conventional measures are not limited to con-
trived hypothetical examples. In a number of countries, we observe
an unambiguous reduction in poverty and a globally progressive
tax and transfer system, while a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor
are ﬁscally impoverished. Using the income concepts from Higgins
et al. (2015), we compare market income (before taxes and trans-
fers) to post-ﬁscal income (after direct and indirect taxes, direct cash
and food transfers, and indirect subsidies) in seventeen developing
countries. We use post-ﬁscal income as the after taxes and trans-
fers income concept even though taxes are used to fund more than
just direct cash and food transfers and indirect subsidies from the
government (e.g., they are used to fund public goods and ser-
vices, many of which also reach the poor) because this is the
income concept relevant for measuring poverty: it is “disposable
money and near-money income” that should be compared to the
poverty line when the latter is based on “a poverty budget for food,
clothing, shelter, and similar items” (Citro and Michael, 1995, p.
212, 237). For low and lower-middle income countries, we use a
poverty line of $1.25 per person per day; for upper middle income
countries, $2.50 per day. Table 2 column 1 shows the pre-ﬁsc
(market income) poverty headcount and column 2 shows the change
in poverty from the pre-ﬁsc to the post-ﬁsc income distribution;
countries in which poverty increased due to the ﬁscal system are
excluded.8
Moving to the progressivity of the tax and transfer system and
change in inequality in each country, column 3 shows the pre-ﬁsc
Gini coeﬃcient and column 4 shows the Reynolds and Smolen-
sky (1977) index, which is a summary indicator corresponding
to tests of global progressivity; the Reynolds–Smolensky equals
the pre-ﬁsc Gini minus the concentration coeﬃcient of post-
ﬁsc income with respect to pre-ﬁsc income, and thus globally
progressive systems have a positive Reynolds–Smolensky index.
Column 5 shows the change in inequality, with negative numbers
indicating that inequality fell as a result of the tax and transfer
system.9
Since we do not derive an axiomatic measure of FI until Section 3,
here we use two intuitively appealing measures likely to have pol-
icy traction. Column 6 shows the percent of the population that are
ﬁscally impoverished and column 7 the percent of the post-ﬁsc poor
that are ﬁscally impoverished. Although all of the countries in Table 2
experienced a reduction in poverty and inequality due to the tax and
transfer system, the amount of FI varies greatly between countries.
In ten countries—Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala,
8 Although the table only shows poverty for a particular poverty line and poverty
measure, it is also true that the post-ﬁsc distribution ﬁrst order stochastically dom-
inates the pre-ﬁsc distribution from 0 to the poverty line used for each country,
meaning that poverty unambiguously fell for all poverty lines up to $1.25 or $2.50 and
all poverty measures in a broad class.
9 We test global progressivity by dominance of the concentration curve of post-ﬁsc
with respect to pre-ﬁsc income over the pre-ﬁsc Lorenz curve, and test unambiguously
equalizing by comparing the post-ﬁsc and pre-ﬁsc Lorenz curves.
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia—between one-
quarter and two-thirds of the post-ﬁsc poor lost income to the ﬁscal
system.10 In other countries, this ﬁgure is much lower, at 13.3% of the
post-ﬁsc poor in South Africa (but, due to the high proportion of the
total population that is poor, still 5.9% of the total population) and
3.2% of the post-ﬁsc poor in Ecuador.
Even when poverty increases from pre-ﬁsc to post-ﬁsc income
and hence we know that FI has occurred (as in Ghana and Ethiopia),
it is impossible to tell its extent without explicit measures like the
ones we propose in Section 3. A stark example of this comes from
Ethiopia, where looking at poverty and progressivity numbers alone
greatly masks the extent of FI: the headcount ratio at $1.25 per day
increases from 31.9% to 33.2% of the population, while the squared
poverty gap and Gini coeﬃcient fall as a result of taxes and trans-
fers (World Bank, 2015). Nevertheless, applying our measures to the
same data, Hill et al. (2016) ﬁnd that 28.5% of Ethiopians and over
80% of the post-ﬁsc poor experience FI.
Even if we add the value of public spending on education and
health (imputed at their government cost to families who report
a child attending public school or who report using public health
facilities), ﬁscal impoverishment is still high in several countries:
in Armenia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Russia, and Tunisia, between 25
and 50% of those who are ﬁscally impoverished before adding
in beneﬁts from public spending on health and education are
still ﬁscally impoverished when these beneﬁts are included as
transfers.
3. Measures of ﬁscal impoverishment
To assess anti-poverty policies in tandem with the taxes used
to ﬁnance them, it is important to have measures of the extent of
ﬁscal impoverishment. In the last section, we provided a glimpse
of FI in several developing countries using two simple, straight-
forward, and intuitive measures that—given these features—can be
useful for policy discussions. These two measures also have draw-
backs, however. To illustrate their limitations, we begin by providing
more detail about the two measures. For a particular poverty line
z ∈ Z , there is ﬁscal impoverishment if y1i < y0i and y1i < z for
some individual i ∈ S. In other words, the individual could be poor
before taxes and transfers and made poorer by the ﬁscal system, or
non-poor before taxes and transfers but poor after. Both straight-
forward measures count the number of individuals who meet this
condition (and are thus ﬁscally impoverished) in the numerator. The
proportion of the population who are ﬁscally impoverished (column
6 of Table 2) divides this numerator by the number of individuals
in society, while the proportion of the post-ﬁsc poor who are ﬁscally
impoverished (column 7) divides it by the number who are post-ﬁsc
poor
(
with y1i < z
)
.
10 If we instead scale down taxes so that they equal the transfers included in our
analysis, which we avoid in the main analysis for the reasons mentioned above in
defense of post-ﬁscal income as the after taxes and transfers income concept, FI is
lower: for example, in Brazil 10.8% of the post-ﬁsc poor are ﬁscally impoverished using
this method.
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Table 2
Poverty, inequality, and ﬁscal impoverishment in developing countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pre-ﬁsc Change in Pre-ﬁsc Reynolds– Change in Fiscally Fiscally
poverty poverty inequality Smolensky inequality impoverished impoverished
headcount headcount (Gini) (post-ﬁsc (DGini) as % of as % of post-
Country (survey year) (%) (p.p.) w.r.t. pre-ﬁsc) population ﬁsc poor
Panel A: Upper-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $2.50 per day
Brazil (2008–2009) 16.8 −0.8 57.5 4.6 −3.5 5.6 34.9
Chile (2013) 2.8 −1.4 49.4 3.2 −3.0 0.3 19.2
Ecuador (2011–2012) 10.8 −3.8 47.8 3.5 −3.3 0.2 3.2
Mexico (2012) 13.3 −1.2 54.4 3.8 −2.5 4.0 32.7
Peru (2011) 13.8 −0.2 45.9 0.9 −0.8 3.2 23.8
Russia (2010) 4.3 −1.3 39.7 3.9 −2.6 1.1 34.4
South Africa (2010–2011) 49.3 −5.2 77.1 8.3 −7.7 5.9 13.3
Tunisia (2010) 7.8 −0.1 44.7 8.0 −6.9 3.0 38.5
Panel B: Lower-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $1.25 per day
Armenia (2011) 21.4 −8.4 47.4 12.9 −9.2 6.2 52.3
Bolivia (2009) 10.9 −0.5 50.3 0.6 −0.3 6.6 63.2
Dominican Republic (2007) 6.8 −0.9 50.2 2.2 −2.2 1.0 16.3
El Salvador (2011) 4.3 −0.7 44.0 2.2 −2.1 1.0 27.0
Guatemala (2010) 12.0 −0.8 49.0 1.4 −1.2 7.0 62.2
Indonesia (2012) 12.0 −1.5 39.8 1.1 −0.8 4.1 39.2
Sri Lanka (2009–2010) 5.0 −0.7 37.1 1.3 −1.1 1.6 36.4
Sources: For Brazil, authors’ calculations. For other countries, provided to us by the authors of the studies cited in Footnote 3.
Notes: p.p.=percentage points. w.r.t.=with respect to. Ethiopia and Ghana are not included in the table because poverty with a $1.25 per day poverty line increased from pre-ﬁsc
to post-ﬁsc income (and hence they do not illustrate shortcomings of conventional measures). Country classiﬁcations are from the World Bank for the year of the survey.
In the context of poverty measurement, Sen (1976, p. 219) pro-
poses a monotonicity axiom requiring that, all else equal, “a reduc-
tion in income of a person below the poverty line must increase
the poverty measure.” We propose a similar axiom for FI mea-
sures requiring that a larger decrease in post-ﬁsc income for an
impoverished person, all else equal, must increase the FI measure.
Monotonicity is violated by the straight-forwardmeasures, which do
not increase when an impoverished person becomes more impov-
erished because she counts as one impoverished individual in the
measure’s numerator regardless of how much income she loses to
the ﬁscal system.11
3.1. Axioms
We propose eight properties desirable for a robust measure of
FI; we describe these properties here and formally deﬁne them in
the Appendix. Throughout, we assume that income is measured in
real terms and has been converted to a common currency such as
US dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity, thereby simplifying
away concerns about inﬂation or currency conversions if comparing
FI over time or across countries.
Our FI monotonicity axiom described above implies not only that
the FI measure must be strictly increasing in the extent to which
an impoverished individual is impoverished (ceteris paribus), but
also that the measure must be strictly increasing in the number of
individuals that are impoverished, holding ﬁxed the amount of FI
experienced by others. The focus axiom, analogous to Sen’s (1981)
focus axiom for poverty measurement, says that different income
changes to the non-impoverished—provided that they remain non-
impoverished—leave the FI measure unchanged. Given the focus
11 Another simple tool to examine FI is the q × q transition matrix P, whose typical
element pkl represents the probability of being in post-ﬁsc income group l ∈ {1, . . . , q}
for an individual in pre-ﬁsc income group k ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Measures based on P also fail
to satisfy FI monotonicity and have the large drawback of not capturing FI among the
poorest pre-ﬁsc group (k = 1).
axiom, it is natural to impose a normalization that if no one is impov-
erished, the FI measure equals zero. Note that this normalization
axiom is not instrumental to our result: if we did not impose it, our
result would be that our axioms uniquely determine a measure of FI
up to a linear (rather than proportional) transformation.12
Similar to Chakravarty’s (1983) continuity axiom for povertymea-
sures, we require the FI measure to be continuous in pre-ﬁsc income,
post-ﬁsc income, and the poverty line (since we may want to assess
FI for a range of possible poverty lines). This is stronger than Fos-
ter and Shorrocks’s (1991) restricted continuity axiom which only
requires the measure to be continuous in incomes below the poverty
line and left-continuous at the poverty line, thus allowing the mea-
sure to jump discontinuously at the poverty line; see Zheng (1997)
and Permanyer (2014) for arguments in favor of using the stronger
continuity axiom in the contexts of unidimensional andmultidimen-
sional poverty measures.
Because “the names of income recipients do not matter” (Zheng,
1997, p. 131), we impose a permutability axiom requiring that if
we take each individual’s pre- and post-ﬁsc income pair and (keep-
ing each pre- and post-ﬁsc income pair as a bundle) shuﬄe these
around the population, FI is unchanged. We use the term “per-
mutability” rather than symmetry or anonymity because—although
both have been used in the same way we use permutability above
(e.g., Cowell, 1985, Fields and Fei, 1978, Plotnick, 1982)—symmetry
and anonymity have also taken on different deﬁnitions. Symme-
try can instead mean, for two income distributions X and Y and a
distance measure d, that d(X,Y) = d(Y,X); the two income
distributions are treated symmetrically: losses are not distinguish-
able from gains (Ebert, 1984, Fields and Ok, 1999). Anonymity
can instead mean that the measure compares the cumulative
distribution of pre-ﬁsc income, F0, to that of post-ﬁsc income, F1,
12 It is also possible to normalize by the measure’s upper bound so that it always lies
on the interval [0, 1] by specifying an axiom that if everyone loses all of their income
to the ﬁscal system (the maximum possible FI), the measure of FI equals 1. We prefer
to avoid normalizing in this way so that the class of axiomatic FI measures is more
general.
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without regard to where a particular individual at position j in F0
ended in F1 (e.g., Bourguignon, 2011a,b). In other words, an anony-
mous measure would compare the pre-ﬁsc income of the jth poorest
individual in F0 to the post-ﬁsc income of the jth poorest individual
in F1, even though “they are not necessarily the same individuals”
because of reranking (Bourguignon, 2011a, p. 607).
Next, we must decide whether our measure of FI should be abso-
lute or relative (recalling that we assume income to be in real terms
of a constant currency, so arguments about inﬂation or currency
exchange should not affect the decision). Suppose each poor indi-
vidual’s pre-ﬁsc income increases by $1, taxes and transfers are held
ﬁxed, and the price of one essential good in the basic goods bas-
ket, normalized to have one unit in the basket, also increases by $1
per unit.13 Each poor individual remains the same distance below
the poverty line; that distance represents the amount of additional
income she needs to afford adequate nutrition and other basic neces-
sities. For those who experience FI, it is the absolute increase in the
distance between that individual’s income and the poverty line that
matters in terms of the quantity of basic goods she can buy. Hence,
we assume that if all pre- and post-ﬁsc incomes increase by $1 and
the poverty line also increases by $1, FI should remain unchanged.
We thus impose translation invariance.
Given our above argument for absolute measures, we also impose
linear homogeneity: if all incomes and the poverty line are multiplied
by the same factor, the measure of FI changes by that factor. Instead,
specifying homogeneity of degree zero (scale invariance) would be
incompatible with translation invariance for the reasons explored
in Zheng (1994). Since we assume that income is expressed in real
terms and a common currency, our measure is nevertheless insen-
sitive to inﬂation or currency changes. The translation invariance
and linear homogeneity axioms have been used together in
axiomatic derivations of measures of inequality (Kolm, 1976),
poverty (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980), economic distance
(Chakravarty and Dutta, 1987, Ebert, 1984), and mobility (Fields and
Ok, 1996, Mitra and Ok, 1998).14
Our ﬁnal axiom is based on a concept introduced to the poverty
literature by Foster et al. (1984, p. 761), who argue that “at the
very least, one would expect that a decrease in the poverty level of
one subgroup ceteris paribus should lead to less poverty for the pop-
ulation as a whole.” Similarly, it would be desirable for a measure of
FI if a decrease in the measured FI for one subgroup of the popula-
tion and no change in the measured FI for all other subgroups results
in a decrease in the measured FI of the entire population. Hence, we
impose a subgroup consistency axiom analogous to the one used for
poverty measurement by Foster and Shorrocks (1991). In his survey
of axiomatic poverty measurement, Zheng (1997, p. 137) notes that
subgroup consistency “has gainedwide recognition in the literature.”
3.2. An axiomatic measure of ﬁscal impoverishment
Proposition 1. A measure satisfying FI monotonicity, focus,
normalization, continuity, permutability, translation invariance, linear
homogeneity, and subgroup consistency is uniquely determined up to a
proportional transformation, and given by
f
(
y0, y1; z
)
= j
∑
i∈S
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
. (1)
13 To avoid inﬂation in this thought experiment, assume that there is an offsetting
fall in the price of a good not in the basic goods basket and not consumed by the poor.
14 By requiring translation invariance and linear homogeneity, we are deriving a
measure of absolute FI; from there, themeasure can nevertheless bemodiﬁed to obtain
other types of desired measures such as a scale invariant measure. This is similar to
the approach taken by Fields and Ok (1996), who axiomatically derive a measure of
absolute mobility from which other desired measures such as mobility proportional
to income can be obtained.
The summand for individual i behaves as follows. For an indi-
vidual who was poor before taxes and transfers and is impover-
ished
(
y1i < y
0
i < z
)
, it is equal to her fall in income, y0i − y1i . For
an individual who was non-poor before taxes and transfers and
is impoverished
(
y1i < z ≤ y0i
)
, it equals her post-ﬁsc poverty gap,
or the amount that would need to be transferred to her to move
her back to the poverty line (equivalently, to prevent her from
becoming impoverished), z − y1i . For a non-impoverished pre-ﬁsc
non-poor individual
(
y0i ≥ z and y1i ≥ z
)
it equals z − z = 0. For a
non-impoverished pre-ﬁsc poor individual
(
y0i < z and y
1
i ≥ y0i
)
it
equals y0i − y0i = 0. Hence, f sums the total amount of FI, multiplied
by a factor of proportionality. This constant can be chosen based on
the preferences of the practitioner: for example, j = 1 gives total FI
(the dark-shaded area in Fig. 1), while j = |S|−1 gives per capita FI.15
3.3. Fiscal impoverishment dominance criteria
Having identiﬁed the existence of FI in a country, a useful imple-
mentation of our FI measure would be to compare the degree of
FI in two situations, e.g. by comparing the current ﬁscal system
to a proposed reform. The choice of poverty line might, however,
inﬂuence our conclusion about which situation entails higher FI.
We thus present a partial FI ordering that can be used to deter-
mine if FI is unambiguously lower in one situation than another
for any poverty line and any measure that satisﬁes FI monotonicity,
focus, normalization, continuity, permutability, translation invari-
ance, linear homogeneity, and subgroup consistency. Since we have
already shown that a FI measure satisﬁes these axioms if and only
if it takes the form in Eq. (1), a simple way to test for FI dom-
inance for any measure satisfying those axioms and any poverty
line in the domain of poverty lines Z is to simply compare the
curves f(y0, y1; z) and f(x0, x1; z) across Z . Interestingly, if the mini-
mum poverty line being considered is 0 (so Z = [0, z+], where z+
is the maximum poverty line), there is an alternative (equivalent)
way to test whether FI is unambiguously lower in one situation than
another that uses a dominance test already developed in themobility
literature: Foster and Rothbaum’s (2014) second order downward
mobility dominance.
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent.
a) FI is unambiguously lower in (y0, y1) than (x0, x1) for any poverty
line in [0, z+] and any measure satisfying FI monotonicity, focus,
normalization, continuity, permutability, translation invariance,
linear homogeneity, and subgroup consistency.
b) f(y0, y1; z) < f(x0, x1; z) for all z ∈ [0, z+].
c) (y0, y1) second order downward mobility dominates (x0, x1) on
[0, z+].
4. Fiscal gains of the poor
Most likely, we will be interested in more than just the extent
to which some poor are not compensated for their tax burden with
transfers: we will also want to know about the gains of other poor
families, and the way in which a comparison of poverty before and
after taxes and transfers can be decomposed into the losses and gains
of different poor households. In this section, we formally deﬁne ﬁscal
gains of the poor, brieﬂy present the axioms for a measure of FGP
15 We do not impose a population invariance axiom; this axiom is commonly
imposed but is criticized by Hassoun and Subramanian (2012). A subset of measures
of form (1) are population invariant: choosing j = |S|−1 gives a measure that satisﬁes
population invariance, while j = 1 gives a measure that does not.
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analogous to those in Section 3.1 for a measure of FI, and present
an axiomatic measure and partial ordering of FGP. We then show
that a commonly used measure of poverty, the poverty gap, can be
decomposed into our axiomatic measures of FI and FGP.
4.1. An axiomatic measure of ﬁscal gains of the poor
There are ﬁscal gains of the poor if y0i < y
1
i and y
0
i < z for some
individual i ∈ S. The individual may or may not receive enough
in net transfers to be post-ﬁsc non-poor (i.e., it is possible that
z ≤ y1i or y1i < z). Consider a pre-ﬁsc poor individual who receives
more in transfers than she pays in taxes. If she is given even more
transfer income, while the pre- and post-ﬁsc incomes of all others
experiencing FGP do not change, FGP should not decrease; if she
would have remained in poverty post-ﬁsc without the additional
transfer income, FGP should increase with the additional transfer.
We impose these conditions in the FGP monotonicity axiom; we also
impose FGP analogues of the other axioms from Section 3.1.
Proposition 3. A measure satisfying FGP monotonicity, focus,
normalization, continuity, permutability, translation invariance, linear
homogeneity, and subgroup consistency is uniquely determined up to a
proportional transformation, and given by
g
(
y0, y1; z
)
= j
∑
i∈S
(
min
{
y1i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
. (2)
An individual who is pre-ﬁsc poor and gains income from the tax
and transfer system, but remains post-ﬁsc poor
(
y0i < y
1
i < z
)
, con-
tributes the amount of her income gain, y1i − y0i , to the measure of
FGP. A pre-ﬁsc poor individual that gains income and as a result
has post-ﬁsc income above the poverty line
(
y0i < z ≤ y1i
)
contributes
the amount of net transfers that pulled her pre-ﬁsc income to the
poverty line, z − y0i . Someone who is pre-ﬁsc poor and does not
gain income
(
y1i ≤ y0i < z
)
contributes y1i − y1i = 0. Someone who is
pre-ﬁsc non-poor
(
z < y0i
)
also contributes 0 (for her, the summand
equals z−z if she remains non-poor or y1i −y1i if she loses income and
becomes poor). For j = 1, g equals the light-shaded area in Fig. 1.
As with ﬁscal impoverishment orderings, a ﬁscal gain partial
ordering can be used to make unambiguous FGP comparisons for any
poverty line and any measure satisfying our axioms. The ordering
compares g(y0, y1; z) to g(x0, x1; z) for all z ∈ Z , and for Z = [0, z+]
coincides with Foster and Rothbaum’s (2014) second order upward
mobility dominance (the proof proceeds similarly to the proof of
Proposition 2 for FI).
4.2. Decomposition of the difference between pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc
poverty
Themost commonmeasures of poverty used in both policy circles
and scholarly papers (e.g., Chen and Ravallion, 2010, Ravallion, 2012)
are the poverty headcount ratio, which enumerates the proportion
of the population that is poor, and the poverty gap, which takes
into account how far the poor fall below the poverty line. The latter
might be expressed in absolute terms, summing the gap between
each poor person’s income and the poverty line, in which case it can
be thought of as the total amount that would need to be given to
the poor to eliminate poverty (if targeting were perfect). Or it can
be normalized, dividing the absolute poverty gap by the poverty line
and population size, for example, to create a scale- and population-
invariant measure. We use a general deﬁnition of the poverty gap
that encompasses its absolute and normalized forms:
p(y; z) = m(S, z)
∑
i∈S
(z − yi) I (yi < z) , (3)
where m(S, z) is a normalization factor. Two special cases are the
absolute poverty gap, where m(S, z) = 1, and the poverty gap ratio,
where m(S, z) = (z|S|)−1. For simplicity and because a comparison of
pre- and post-ﬁsc poverty usually occurs for a ﬁxed population and
given poverty line, we assume that S and z are ﬁxed in what follows.
Proposition 4. A change in the poverty gap before and after taxes and
transfers is equal to the difference between the axiomatic measures of FI
and FGP from Eqs. (1) and (2), multiplied by a constant.
Given the assumption that the population and poverty line are
ﬁxed, m(S, z) is a constant that we denote m¯. The poverty gap in
Eq. (3) can be rewritten as p(y; z) = m¯∑i∈S (z − yi) I (yi < z) =
m¯
∑
i∈S (z −min {yi, z}), so we have p
(
y1; z) − p (y0; z) =
m¯
∑
i∈S
(
z −min {y1i , z})− m¯∑i∈S (z −min {y0i , z}), or
p
(
y1; z
)
− p
(
y0; z
)
= m¯
[∑
i∈S
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
−
∑
i∈S
(
min
{
y1i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})]
=
m¯
j
[
f
(
y0, y1; z
)
− g
(
y0, y1; z
)]
.
Comparisons of pre- and post-ﬁsc poverty are often used to
assess whether the tax and transfer system helps or hurts the
poor. This decomposition can be used to dig deeper into that net
effect and observe the extent to which a net reduction in poverty
masks the offsetting gains of some poor and impoverishment of
others at the hands of the (possibly progressive) tax and transfer
system.
5. Illustration
5.1. Results for seventeen developing countries
We saw in Section 2 that in ﬁfteen of seventeen developing
countries for which we have data, the tax and transfer system is
poverty-reducing and progressive but, in many cases, ﬁscally impov-
erishes a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor. In Table 3, we present
FI and FGP results for these countries using the axiomatic measures
derived in Sections 3 and 4. Column 1 gives total FI (i.e., the axiomatic
measure from Eq. (1) with j = 1) and column 2 total FGP, both
expressed in millions of 2005 US dollars per year using purchas-
ing power parity adjusted exchange rates. Because the axiomatic
measure with j = 1 is population variant, FI and FGP tend to be
higher in more populous countries; these absolute amounts of FI
and FGP can be useful, for example, in comparisons to the size of a
country’s main cash transfer program, as we show for Brazil below.
To ease interpretation and comparison across countries, column 3
shows FI expressed as a percent of FGP, while columns 4 and 5 show
FI and FGP per capita (where per capita refers to dividing by the
entire population), normalized by the poverty line; each of these is
population invariant.
There is large heterogeneity in the extent to which some poor are
hurt by the tax and transfer system relative to the extent to which
other poor gain, despite that the same range of policies, including
direct taxes, direct cash and near-cash transfers, indirect consump-
tion taxes, and indirect subsidies were considered in each country
study. Among the upper-middle income countries, FI as a percent
of FGP (using a poverty line of $2.50 per day) ranges from less than
1% in Ecuador to 40% in Tunisia. In low and lower-middle income
countries, FI as a percent of FGP (using a poverty line of $1.25 per
day) is even higher in some countries, reaching 55% in Guatemala and
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Table 3
Fiscal impoverishment and gains of the poor in developing countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total FI Total FGP FI as % Per capita Per capita Change in
($ millions ($ millions of FGP FI as % FGP as % poverty gap
Country (survey year) per year) per year) of z of z ratio (p.p.)
Panel A: Upper-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $2.50 per day
Brazil (2008–2009) 676.0 3503.6 19.3 0.39 2.02 −1.63
Chile (2013) 2.0 93.3 2.1 0.01 0.59 −0.58
Ecuador (2011–2012) 1.1 277.8 0.4 0.01 2.00 −1.99
Mexico (2012) 227.7 1446.5 15.7 0.21 1.35 −1.14
Peru (2011) 53.7 177.0 30.3 0.20 0.65 −0.45
Russia (2010) 84.9 1561.4 5.4 0.07 1.24 −1.17
South Africa (2010–2011) 186.6 5964.0 3.1 0.41 12.96 −12.56
Tunisia (2010) 20.8 52.0 40.0 0.23 0.59 −0.35
Panel B: Low and lower-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $1.25 per day
Armenia (2011) 6.3 117.9 5.3 0.44 8.17 −7.74
Bolivia (2009) 25.9 32.2 80.6 0.55 0.68 −0.13
Dominican Republic (2007) 4.4 105.1 4.2 0.02 0.53 −0.51
El Salvador (2011) 1.2 11.1 11.1 0.04 0.39 −0.35
Ethiopia (2010–2011) 408.9 392.8 104.1 1.18 1.13 0.05
Ghana (2013) 25.9 9.9 262.1 0.22 0.08 0.13
Guatemala (2010) 20.7 37.8 54.9 0.33 0.61 −0.27
Indonesia (2012) 150.2 531.5 28.3 0.13 0.47 −0.34
Sri Lanka (2009–2010) 4.4 25.5 17.1 0.05 0.27 −0.23
Sources: For Brazil, authors’ calculations. For other countries, provided to us by the authors of the studies cited in Footnote 3.
Notes: p.p. = percentage points. z denotes the poverty line. “$ millions” denotes millions of 2005 US dollars, at purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rates. Country
classiﬁcations are from the World Bank for the year of the survey.
81% in Bolivia; in Ethiopia and Ghana—the two countries in which
post-ﬁsc poverty is higher than pre-ﬁsc poverty—FI exceeds FGP.
Column 6 shows the change in the poverty gap ratio from pre-
ﬁsc to post-ﬁsc income, which by Proposition 4 can be decomposed
into FI per capita minus FGP per capita, both normalized by the
poverty line like the poverty gap ratio. This decomposition reveals
some interesting traits of each country’s tax and transfer system.
For example, Ecuador achieves the same FGP per capita as Brazil
but with nearly no FI, compared to substantial FI in Brazil; as a
result, the poverty gap is reduced by more in Ecuador. The differ-
ence in FI might be attributable to the multiple consumption taxes
levied at the state and federal levels in Brazil: these are high and
often cascading, and consumption tax exemptions for basic goods
are almost non-existent (Corbacho et al., 2013), compared to a
system that exempts food, basic necessities, andmedicine in Ecuador
(Llerena Pinto et al., 2015). Interestingly, most of those experiencing
FI are not excluded from the safety net; they do receive government
transfers or subsidies: 65% of the impoverished in Brazil receive cash
transfers from Bolsa Família, for example.
It is also noteworthy that Peru, one of the countries in which
less than a quarter of the post-ﬁsc poor experience FI, nevertheless
redistributes low amounts to the poor, and thus has a low reduction
in the poverty gap; this is consistent with Jaramillo’s (2014, p. 391)
ﬁnding that Peru’s low poverty reduction induced by ﬁscal policy
is “associated with low social spending rather than with ineﬃcient
spending.” Among three lower-middle income countries that each
reduce the poverty gap ratio by about 0.3 percentage points (El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Indonesia), Guatemala has high FI but also
higher FGP, while El Salvador has lower FGP but very low FI, and
Indonesia falls in the middle. We do not attempt to answer whether
a lower-FI, lower-FGP or higher-FI, higher-FGP system is preferable
from a welfare perspective, but note that this decomposition enables
a substantially richer analysis than the typical comparison of poverty
before and after taxes and transfers.
5.2. Results for a range of poverty lines in Brazil
So far, the FI and FGP results we have presented use a ﬁxed
poverty line ($1.25 in low and lower-middle income countries
and $2.50 in upper-middle income countries). We now extend the
analysis to a range of poverty lines, focusing the illustration on data
from Brazil, using the Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (Family
Expenditure Survey) 2008–2009. The precise direct and indirect
taxes, direct cash and food transfers, and indirect subsidies included
in our analysis are described in detail in Higgins and Pereira (2014).
As we stated in Section 2.3, the tax and transfer system in
Brazil is unambiguously poverty-reducing for any poverty line up to
$2.50 per person per day, globally progressive, and unambiguously
equalizing.16 This is shown in Fig. 2, where cumulative distribution
functions reveal that the post-ﬁsc distribution ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates the pre-ﬁsc distribution on the domain [0, 2.5],
which implies an unambiguous reduction in poverty for any poverty
line in this domain and any measure in a broad class (Atkinson,
1987, Foster and Shorrocks, 1988);17 the post-ﬁsc concentration
curve with respect to pre-ﬁsc income dominates the pre-ﬁsc Lorenz
curve, which implies global progressivity (in the income redistri-
bution sense; see Duclos, 2008); and the post-ﬁsc Lorenz curve
dominates the pre-ﬁsc Lorenz curve, which implies that the ﬁscal
system is unambiguously equalizing (Atkinson, 1970). If, however,
we extend themaximum poverty line to, say, $4 per person per day—
a poverty line frequently used by the World Bank when studying
middle-income Latin American countries (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2013)—
poverty is no longer unambiguously lowered by the ﬁscal system:
for poverty lines above about $3 per day, the poverty headcount is
higher after taxes and transfers than before. We would thus know
16 Nevertheless, the tax and transfer system reduces poverty by less than its
potential under the type of optimal redistribution considered by Fellman et al. (1999),
which follows a lexicographicmaximin principle. Replacing the actual tax systemwith
optimal taxes of this type (which, in total, equal the size of actual taxes), and replacing
the actual distribution of Bolsa Família beneﬁts with the optimal one (redistribut-
ing all transfers this way would completely eliminate poverty, so we only optimally
redistribute Bolsa Família for illustration), the lowest income in the population would
be $1.92 per day, the post-ﬁsc poverty gap ratio would be 2.6% of the poverty line
rather than 5.5%, and the post-ﬁsc Gini would be 45.3 rather than 53.9.
17 We verify that this ﬁrst order dominance is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
using the asymptotic sampling distribution derived by Davidson and Duclos (2000)
with a null hypothesis of non-dominance; the result is also robust to the type of data
contamination considered in Cowell and Victoria-Feser (2002).
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Fig. 2. Conventional tools to assess the tax and transfer system in Brazil. Note: Dashed vertical lines included at common "international" poverty lines of $1.25 and $2.50 per
person per day.
that FI occurred using conventional measures and a poverty line
above $3 per day, but would still be unaware of its extent without FI
measures.18
Using the $2.50 line, we know that 5.6% of Brazil’s population
and over one-third of its post-ﬁsc poor experience FI (Table 2); these
impoverished individuals pay a total of $676 million more in taxes
than they receive in transfers annually (Table 3), which is equiv-
alent to 10% of the 2009 budget of Bolsa Família, Brazil’s ﬂagship
anti-poverty program that reaches over one-fourth of the coun-
try’s population. While substantial in size, this FI is dwarfed by FGP
from Brazil’s transfer programs, which totals over $3.5 billion. The
absolute poverty gap, or the minimum amount that would need
to be transferred to the poor to eliminate poverty if transfers were
perfectly targeted, falls from $12.4 billion before taxes and trans-
fers to $9.6 billion after. The change in the absolute poverty gap,
$2.8 billion, looks impressive, but masks differential trends in two
groups of the poor: those who gain (a total of $3.5 billion) and those
who lose (a total of $676 million), as revealed by the decomposition
of the change in the poverty gap derived in Section 4.
Fig. 3 shows how this decomposition and our axiomatic measures
of total FI and FGP in Brazil vary with the poverty line. For low
poverty lines, FI is essentially non-existent: at $1.25 per day, for
example, total FI is $28 million per year, or 0.4% of the 2009
budget of Bolsa Família (Fig. 3a). This is not surprising in light of
the unconditional component of the government cash transfer pro-
gram Bolsa Família, available to households with income below 70
reais per person permonth ($1.22 per day), regardless of whether the
household has children or elderly members, and without conditions.
At higher poverty lines, FI begins to increase more rapidly, and at
a poverty line of $2.88 the rate of increase of FI exceeds the rate
of increase of FGP: this can be seen by comparing the slopes of the
solid curves in Fig. 3a, or by looking at the point where the difference
between the two curves (plotted as the dashed curve in Fig. 3a) is
at its maximum. By Proposition 4, this is also the point at which the
absolute poverty gap reduction acheived by the ﬁscal system reaches
its maximum, as seen by the dashed curve in Fig. 3b.
At this poverty line of $2.88 per day, where maximum poverty
reduction is achieved, the difference between the pre-ﬁsc and
post-ﬁsc poverty gaps is $2.9 billion. The eligibility cut-off for the
18 It is easy to show that if the post-ﬁsc distribution does not ﬁrst order stochastically
dominate the pre-ﬁsc distribution on the domain from 0 to themaximumpoverty line,
then FI has occurred.
conditional component of Bolsa Família, available to families with
children who comply with certain education and health require-
ments, is $2.45 per person per day. Just above this line, a number of
families still receive beneﬁts due to program leakages, variable and
mismeasured income, or components of income we are measuring
that are not taken into account in the estimation of eligible income;
not far above the line, however, families become much less likely to
receive the program and we see a simultaneous deceleration of ﬁscal
gains and acceleration of impoverishment.
6. Conclusions
Anti-poverty policies are increasingly being discussed in the same
breath as the taxes used to pay for them. One example is the focus
on mobilizing domestic resources to ﬁnance the policies necessary
to achieve the United Nations’ Post-2015 Sustainable Development
Goals. To analyze transfers, subsidies, and taxes together, poverty
comparisons and progressivity measures are often used. These mea-
sures, however, can lead us to conclude that the tax and transfer
system unambiguously beneﬁts the poor, when in fact a substantial
number of poor are not compensated with transfers for their tax bur-
dens. Indeed, we observe this in a number of developing countries:
out of seventeen developing countries for which we have data,
ﬁfteen have tax and transfer systems that unambiguously reduce
poverty and are globally progressive, but in ten of these at least one-
quarter of the poor pay more in taxes than they receive in transfers
and subsidies. In Brazil, for example, over one-third of the post-ﬁsc
poor experience ﬁscal impoverishment, paying a total of $676million
more in taxes than they receive in transfers and subsidies.
Given this shortcoming of conventional criteria and the debate
about anti-poverty policies and the taxes used to pay for them,
we propose a set of axioms that should be met by a measure of
FI, and show that these uniquely determine the measure up to a
proportional transformation. We also propose a partial ordering to
determine when one ﬁscal system, such as that under a proposed
reform, induces unambiguously less FI than another, such as the
current system, over a range of possible poverty lines. To obtain a
complete picture of the ﬁscal system’s effect on the poor, we propose
an analogous measure of ﬁscal gains of the poor, and show that the
difference between the pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc poverty gaps can be
decomposed into our axiomatic measures of FI and FGP.
Our results can be extended to comparisons between two points
in time or before and after a policy reform, rather than pre- and
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Fig. 3. FI, FGP, and poverty gaps in Brazil for various poverty lines. Note: Dashed vertical lines included at common "international" poverty lines of $1.25 and $2.50 per person per
day.
post-ﬁsc. In comparison to the tools used to assess whether the
tax and transfer system hurts the poor, tools from the literatures
on pro-poor growth and policy reforms (tax and subsidy reforms,
trade liberalization, etc.) suffer from similar limitations. For pro-
poor growth,19 poverty measures and stochastic dominance tests
are often used to assess whether poverty is unambiguously reduced
over time; it directly follows from the ﬁrst row of Table 1 that these
will not necessarily capture that some of the poor become poorer
over time. Hence, growth can appear unambiguously pro-poor even
if a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor are immiserized. Growth inci-
dence curves (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) and related pro-poor partial
orderings (Duclos, 2009) can fail to capture impoverishment for the
same reason that stochastic dominance tests do: they are anonymous
with respect to initial income. Although their non-anonymous coun-
terparts (Bourguignon, 2011a, Grimm, 2007, Van Kerm, 2009) resolve
this issue in theory, in practice—to become graphically tractable—
they average within percentiles, and hence impoverishment can still
be overlooked if within some percentiles, some poor are “hurting
behind the averages” (Ravallion, 2001, p. 1811).
For consumption tax and subsidy reform, Besley and Kanbur
(1988) derive poverty-reducing conditions for reallocating food
subsidies; these results are extended to commodity taxes and a
broader class of poverty measures by Makdissi and Wodon (2002)
and Duclos et al. (2008). Again, by the ﬁrst row of Table 1, unambigu-
ous poverty reduction does not guarantee that a substantial portion
of the poor are not hurt by the reform. Studies that evaluate indirect
tax reform with measures that take pre-ﬁsc positions into account
but average within groups, such as the percent gain or loss caused
by the reform for each income or expenditure decile (Mirrlees et al.,
2011, Chapter 9), can again overlook FI that occurswithin each group.
In the literature on trade liberalization, Harrison et al. (2003
p. 97) note that “even the most attractive reforms will typically
result in some households losing,” and recent efforts to measure
19 Here, we are using the poverty-reducing or weak absolute deﬁnition of pro-poor
(in the respective taxonomies of Kakwani and Son (2008) and Klasen (2008)), bywhich
“growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of interest falls” (Kraay, 2006, p. 198).
We could instead adopt a relative deﬁnition of pro-poor growth (Kakwani and Pernia,
2000); growth-adjusted stochastic dominance tests can be used to determine when
growth is unambiguously relatively pro-poor (Duclos, 2009), and it can be shown
that this type of dominance can also occur despite a signiﬁcant portion of the poor
becoming poorer.
welfare impact at the household level have been made following
Porto (2006). Nevertheless, because results are presented at some
aggregate level (e.g., by state or percentile), impoverishment due to
trade reform could still be overlooked. For example, Nicita’s (2009, p.
26) ﬁnding that “on average all income groups beneﬁted from [Mex-
ico’s] trade liberalization, but to a varying extent” does not tell us
the extent to which some households within each group were made
worse off by the reform.
In each of these cases, our axiomatically derived FI measure could
be used to quantify the impoverishment of those becoming poorer
over time or the extent to which losers are hurt by policy reforms.
Our decomposition could be used to examine the extent to which a
decrease in poverty over time or due to a reform balances out the
gains and losses of different households. Doing so, we will cease to
overlook cases where growth, policy reform, or the tax and transfer
system is poverty-reducing and progressive, yet hurts a substantial
proportion of the poor.
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Appendix A
A.1. FI axioms
Consider pre- and post-ﬁsc incomes y0i , y
1
i ∈ R+ for each i ∈ S;
denote the vectors of pre- and post-ﬁsc income for these individu-
als by y0 and y1, both ordered by pre-ﬁsc income y0i . Now consider
income vectors for the same individuals under different pre- and
post-ﬁsc scenarios, denoted by x0 and x1, both ordered by pre-ﬁsc
income x0i . The sets of impoverished individuals in scenarios (y
0, y1)
and (x0, x1) are denoted Iy ≡ {i ∈ S | y1i < y0i and y1i < z} and
Ix ≡
{
i ∈ S | x1i < x0i and x1i < z
}
. A measure of FI is a function f :⋃∞
n=1 R
n
+ ×
⋃∞
n=1 R
n
+ × R+ → R , which takes as arguments the pre-
and post-ﬁsc income vectors and the poverty line.
Axiom 1 (FI Monotonicity). If y0i = x
0
i for all i ∈ S and there exists
j ∈ Iy ∪ Ix such that y1j > x1j , while y1k = x1k for all k ∈ Iy ∪ Ix  {j}, then
f(y0, y1; z) < f(x0, x1; z).
Axiom 2 (Focus). If y0i = x
0
i and y
1
i = x
1
i for all i ∈ Iy ∪ Ix, then
f(y0, y1; z) = f(x0, x1; z).
Axiom 3 (Normalization). Iy = ∅ ⇒ f
(
y0, y1; z)= 0.
Axiom 4 (Continuity). f is jointly continuous in y0i , y
1
i , and z.
Axiom 5 (Permutability). f(y0, y1; z) = f(y0s , y1s ; z) for any permuta-
tion function s : S → S, where y0s ≡
(
y0s(1), . . . , y
0
s(|S|)
)
and y1s ≡(
y1s(1), . . . , y
1
s(|S|)
)
.
Axiom 6 (Translation Invariance). f(y0 + a1|S|, y1 + a1|S|; z + a) =
f(y0, y1; z) for all a ∈ R , where 1|S| denotes a vector of ones with
length |S|.
Axiom 7 (Linear Homogeneity). f(ky0,ky1; kz) = kf(y0, y1; z) for all
k ∈ R++.
Axiom 8 (Subgroup Consistency). Partition S into m subsets
S1, . . . , Sm, and denote the vectors of pre- and post-ﬁsc incomes for
individuals belonging to subset Sa, a ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, by y0a and y1a or
x0a and x
1
a . If f
(
y0a , y
1
a ; z
)
< f
(
x0a , x
1
a ; z
)
for some a ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
f
(
y0b , y
1
b ; z
)
= f
(
x0b , x
1
b ; z
)
for all b ∈ {1, . . . ,m} {a}, then f(y0, y1; z) <
f(x0, x1; z).
A.2. FGP axioms
Let the sets of pre-ﬁsc poor individuals experiencing ﬁscal gains
under two scenarios be denoted Gy ≡
{
i ∈ S | y0i < y1i and y0i < z
}
and Gx ≡
{
i ∈ S | x0i < x1i and x0i < z
}
. A measure of FGP is a function
g :
⋃∞
n=1 R
n
+ ×
⋃∞
n=1 R
n
+ × R+ → R , which takes as arguments the
pre- and post-ﬁsc income vectors and the poverty line.
Axiom 1′ (FGP Monotonicity). If y0i = x
0
i for all i ∈ S and there exists
j ∈ Gy ∪ Gx such that y1j < x1j , while y1k = x1k for all k ∈ Gy ∪ Gx  {j},
then g(y0, y1; z) ≤ g(x0, x1; z), with strict inequality if y1j < z.
The remaining axioms for FI are desirable for a measure of FGP as
well, and carry over directly to FGP after replacing f with g, Iy with
Gy, and Ix with Gx.
A.3. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin with a lemma analogous to one
of the propositions in Foster and Shorrocks (1991). To simplify nota-
tion, ya ≡ (y0a , y1a) for a subset Sa of a partition of S into m subgroups
a = 1, . . . ,m; similarly, xa ≡ (x0a , x1a). We also deﬁne vectors yt−a ≡(
ytb
)
b =a∈{1,...,m}, t ∈ {0, 1} as the vector of pre- or post-ﬁsc incomes of
all i /∈ Sa (similarly for xt−a) and y−a ≡
(
y0−a, y1−a
)
, x−a ≡
(
x0−a, x1−a
)
. 
Lemma 1. f(ya, y−a; z) ≥ f(xa, y−a; z) ⇒ f(ya, x−a; z) ≥ f(xa, x−a; z).
Proof. By subgroup consistency, f(ya, y−a; z) ≥ f(xa, y −a; z) ⇒
f(ya; z) ≥ f(xa; z). (Suppose not. Then f(ya; z) < f(xa; z), which by sub-
group consistency implies f(ya, y−a; z) < f(xa, y−a; z), a contradiction.)
f(ya; z) ≥ f(xa; z) implies either f(ya; z)> f(xa; z) or f(ya; z) = f(xa; z).
In the former case, it immediately follows by subgroup consistency
that f(ya, x−a; z) ≥ f(xa, x−a; z). In the latter case, the implication
is shown by contradiction. Suppose that f(ya, x−a; z) < f(xa, x−a; z).
Then by subgroup consistency we have (since f(ya; z) = f(xa; z))
f(ya, x−a, xa; z) < f(xa, x−a, ya; z), which contradicts permutability. 
This lemma shows that a subgroup-consistent and permutable
measure of FI is separable by group, using a deﬁnition of separabil-
ity analogous to that used for preferences in the utility literature.
Because the lemma can be reiterated within any particular subgroup
to further separate individuals in that subgroup, we have that each
set of individuals is separable (which is analogous to the “each set of
sectors is separable” requirement in Gorman (1968, p. 368)). Hence,
from Debreu (1960, Theorem 3), there exists a continuous FI function
determined up to an increasing linear transformation of the form
f
(
y0, y1; z
)
= a+ b
∑
i∈S0i
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
where 0i is a real-valued function for each i ∈ S. The additional
requirement for Debreu’s (1960) proof that more than two of the |S|
elements of S are essential is satisﬁed as long as |S| ≥ 3 and f is non-
constant on [0, z], which in turn is implied by monotonicity as long
as at least one individual is impoverished.20
Permutability implies that 0i = 0j for all i, j ∈ S, so we have
f
(
y0, y1; z) = a + b∑0 (y0i , y1i , z) where 0 is a real-valued function.
By the focus and normalization axioms:
0
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
=
{
0˜
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
if y1i < y
0
i and y
1
i < z
0 otherwise.
(4)
By the continuity of f, 0 and 0˜ must also be continuous. Consider
an individual with y0i > z and y
1
i = z. Since y
1
i is not less than z, i
is not impoverished, so by Eq. (4), 0
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
= 0. Now consider an
alternative situation where y˜1i = z − 4 for a suﬃciently small 4>0.
In this scenario, 0˜ cannot be a direct function of y0i or 0 would be
discontinuous at z; instead, 0˜ must be a direct function of just y1i
and z so that an inﬁnitesimal decrease in y1i below z results in an
inﬁnitesimal increase in 0. By a similar argument, for an individual
with y0i < z, y
1
i = y
0
i , and y˜
1
i = y
0
i − 4, 0˜ cannot be a direct function
of z and instead must directly depend only on y1i and y
0
i so that an
inﬁnitesimal decrease in y1i below y
0
i < z results in an inﬁnitesimal
increase in 0.
20 The assumptions of at least three individuals in society and at least one impover-
ished individual are innocuous for any real-world application.
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Given this, we can rewrite 0˜
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
= 0˜
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
, y1i
)
. Since
0˜ is only deﬁned for those who are impoverished (i.e., those for
whommin
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
}
= y1i ), we have
0˜
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
= 0˜
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
,min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
(5)
= 0˜
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
}
, 0
)
(6)
=
(
min
{
y0i , z
}
−min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
0˜(1, 0) (7)
where Eq. (6) follows from translation invariance and Eq. (7) from
linear homogeneity. Noting that 0˜(1, 0) is a constant (that is positive
by monotonicity) and denoting it c, we have
0
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
=
{(
min
{
y0i , z
}−min {y0i , y1i , z})c if i ∈ Iy
0 otherwise.
For i /∈ Iy we can also write 0
(
y0i , y
1
i , z
)
=
(
min
{
y0i , z
}−
min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
})
c since the non-impoverished are either non-poor
before taxes and transfers and non-poor after
(⇒ min {y0i , z}=
min
{
y0i , y
1
i , z
}
= z
)
or poor before taxes and transfers but do not lose
income to the ﬁscal system
(⇒ min {y0i , z}= min {y0i , y1i , z}= y0i ).
Therefore f
(
y0, y1; z)= a+ bc∑i∈S (min {y0i , z}−min {y0i , y1i , z}). By
normalization, a = 0, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a)⇐⇒(b) follows immediately from
Proposition 1. For (b)⇐⇒(c), we begin by deﬁning Foster and
Rothbaum’s (2014) second order downward mobility dominance.
Deﬁnition 1. (y0, y1) second order downward mobility dominates
(x0, x1) on [0, z+] if
∫ z
0
m
(
y0, y1; c
)
dc <
∫ z
0
m
(
x0, x1; c
)
dc ∀ z ∈ [0, z+],
where m
(
y0, y1; z) = |S|−1∑i∈SI (y1i < z < y0i ) is Foster and Roth-
baum’s (2014) downwardmobility curve, measuring the proportion of
the population that begins with income above each poverty line and
ends with income below the line.
A suﬃcient condition for (b) being equivalent to (c) is
f
(
y0, y1; z) ∝ ∫ z0 m (y0, y1; c) dc. For a given poverty line z = zˆ, par-
tition the set S into four subsets: S1 =
{
i ∈ S | y1i < y0i < zˆ
}
, S2 ={
i ∈ S | y1i < zˆ ≤ y0i
}
, S3 =
{
i ∈ S | y0i ≥ zˆ, y1i ≥ zˆ
}
, S4 ={
i ∈ S | y0i < zˆ, y0i ≤ y1i
}
. For any subset Sa ⊂ S, denote fa( • ; z) ≡
j
∑
i∈Sa
(
min
{
y0i , z
}−min {y0i , y1i , z}) and ma( • ; z) ≡ |S|−1∑i∈Sa
I(
y1i < z < y
0
i
)
.
Each i ∈ S1 experiences downward mobility on the interval [0, zˆ]
for all z ∈ (y1i , y0i ) ⇒ individual i ∈ S1 increases m1( • ; z) by |S|−1 for
z ∈ (y1i , y0i ) and by zero for z ≤ y1i and z ≥ y0i ⇒ individual i ∈ S1
increases
∫ zˆ
0 m1( • ; c)dc by |S|−1
(
y0i − y1i
)
. Summing over all i ∈ S1,∫ zˆ
0 m1( • ; c)dc =
∑
i∈S1 |S|−1
(
y0i − y1i
)
.
y1i < y
0
i < zˆ ∀ i ∈ S1 ⇒ f1( • ; zˆ) = j
∑
i∈S1
(
y0i − y1i
) ⇒
f1( • ; zˆ) = j|S|
∫ zˆ
0
m1( • ; c)dc. (8)
Each i ∈ S2 experiences downward mobility on the inter-
val [0, zˆ] for all z ∈ (y1i , zˆ], which increases m2( • ; z) by |S|−1 for
z ∈ (y1i , zˆ] and by zero for all other z ⇒ individual i ∈ S2
increases
∫ zˆ
0 m2( • ; c)dc by |S|−1
(
zˆ − y1i
)
. Summing over all i ∈ S2,∫ zˆ
0 m2( • ; c)dc =
∑
i∈S2 |S|−1
(
zˆ − y1i
)
.
y1i < zˆ ≤ y0i ∀ i ∈ S2 ⇒ f2
(
zˆ, •
)
= j
∑
i∈S2
(
zˆ − y1i
) ⇒
f2
(
• ; zˆ)= j|S| ∫ zˆ
0
m2( • ; c)dc. (9)
Each i ∈ S3 does not experience downward mobility on the inter-
val [0, zˆ]; summing over all i ∈ S3 and integrating over our domain,
we have
∫ zˆ
0 m3( • ; c)dc = 0. y0i ≥ zˆ and y1i ≥ zˆ ∀ i ∈ S3 ⇒
f3( • ; zˆ) = j
∑
i∈S3
(zˆ − zˆ) = 0 = j|S|
∫ zˆ
0
m3( • ; c)dc. (10)
Similarly
∫ zˆ
0 m4( • ; c)dc = 0 because each i ∈ S4 does not
experience downward mobility on [0, zˆ]. y0i < zˆ and y
0
i ≤ y1i ∀ i ∈
S4 ⇒
f4( • ; zˆ) = j
∑
i∈S4
(
y0i − y0i
)
= 0 = j|S|
∫ zˆ
0
m4( • ; c)dc. (11)
Given the deﬁnitions of fa( • ; z) andma( • ; z) and that S = S1 ∪S2 ∪
S3 ∪ S4 and S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3 ∩ S4 = ∅, we have f
(
y0, y1; z) =∑4a=1 fa( • ; z)
and m
(
y0, y1; z) = ∑4a=1 ma( • ; z). Hence, by Eqs. (8)–(11),
f
(
y0, y1; zˆ) = j|S| ∫ zˆ0 m( • ; c)dc. This holds for all zˆ ∈ [0, z+] since the
choice of zˆwas arbitrary, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 for
FI. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Given in text. 
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